Phenomenological epistemologies of moral and religious experience face a small number of characteristic logical pitfalls whose consequences, when they are not avoided, ramify through an entire programme. Three such pitfalls are examined in this paper through their systematic exemplification in the work of Anthony J. Steinbock, whose programme spanning Moral Emotions (2014), Phenomenology and...
The article reconstructs the methodological context in which Jacques Waardenburg’s neo-phenomenology of religion emerges. It argues that Waardenburg’s project is not an external rejection of classical phenomenology of religion, but its internal critical revision. Classical phenomenology gave religious studies a language for describing religious phenomena and preserved attention to meaning, yet...
Memory is not merely the storage of data; it is the scaffolding of reality. When biological memory fades, the world does not simply turn black; it regresses into an unrecognizable chaos. Echoes of the Prior is an interactive installation that attempts to visualize this subjective phenomenology of forgetting . By inducing controlled synaptic decay within a Feed-Forward 3D Reconstruction model,...
Abstract Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. This volume includes two main clusters of articles—one on the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind, the other on the philosophical psychology of the reactive attitudes—as well as articles on mental representation, consciousness and moral status,...
The study reconstructs the categorical core of Jacques Waardenburg’s neo‑phenomenology of religion through an analysis of the relation between objective religious facts and subjective meanings. The article examines the concepts of religious fact, subjective meaning, intentionality, the supposed/posited object, faith, context, understanding, and the verification of interpretation, as well as...
This paper presents a systematic critical review of consciousness science from the formulation of the hard problem (Chalmers, 1995) to the present (2025). Using a methodology of primary source verification and explicit epistemic stratification — distinguishing established findings from debated results and speculative proposals — we map four theoretical frameworks (Integrated Information Theory,...
Abstract: This chapter argues that allegory, as a structure that supports appearances, has a fundamental connection to phenomenology, the study of appearances. By analysing a foundational philosophical text, Plato’s Republic, and the appearance of the ideal world in the ‘allegory of the cave’, the essay shows that allegory phenomenalizes the power of language to bring worlds into appearance in...
This article examines the hard problem of consciousness, as defined by David Chalmers in his 1995 paper, against five distinct, philosophically rigorous positions developed within the Indian philosophical tradition over approximately 2,500 years, while giving full, undiminished weight to the current empirical state of consciousness science. It reviews the 2025 Cogitate Consortium adversarial...
Abstract This article argues that the contemporary debate surrounding the hard problem of consciousness confirms Lev Shestov’s structural critique of rationalist philosophy. First, it shows that the hard problem should not be understood as a merely recent technical difficulty within analytic philosophy, but as a new configuration of a much older conflict between rational explanation and lived...
David Chalmers’ 'hard problem' of consciousness—how subjective experience arises from physical processes—has dominated philosophy of mind for decades. This paper argues that the hard problem is not a problem at all, but a category error—a confusion between classical and second-order cybernetic questions. By treating consciousness as an object to be explained from a third-person perspective,...