AbstractThis chapter explores two routes from phenomenology to extended cognition. One appeals directly to the contents of conscious experience, for example, the subject's sense of having an extended body under certain conditions. It is argued that the best account of such results is an error theory, one that appeals to neural representations of body, self, and the environment; the general...
To figure out whether the main empirical question "Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?" is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a...
AbstractThis chapter addresses a realization-based interpretation of the extended approach. On this view, cognitive states are states of an organismically bounded cognitive system, yet may still have realizers—that is, physical implementations—that extend beyond the boundary of the organism. Functionalism in philosophy of mind, as well as the associated idea of a physical realization, is...
Model psychosis is characterised by experimentally induced symptoms of withdrawal from reality, frequently accompanied by perceptual disturbances, thought disorders, delusional ideas and sometimes by hallucinations. These "altered states of consciousness" provide a long-standing and valid approach to enhance our understanding of certain aspects of schizophrenia. Targeting the endocannabinoid...
Abstract Neuroscientific evidence interprets both hypnotic trance induction and different meditation traditions as modified states of consciousness that emphasize attention, concentration and the letting go of thoughts, but they differ in terms of sensory input, processing, memory, and the sense of time. Furthermore, hypnosis is based on the suggestibility of a person and meditation on...
In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be...
OBJECTIVES: To analyse the experiences of participants with Parkinson's disease (PD), who participated in an 8-week mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) course. DESIGN AND METHOD: Interpretative phenomenological analysis guided the design and method used in this study. A total of twelve participants (seven men and five women) with PD were recruited prior to and following participation in...
Freud (and later commentators) have failed to explain how the origins of psychoanalytical theory began with a positivist investment without recognizing a dual epistemological commitment: simply, Freud engaged positivism because he believed it generally equated with empiricism, which he valued, and he rejected "philosophy," and, more specifically, Kantianism, because of the associated...
Extensions of Lockean and Kantian concepts offer new insights into the neurophysiology of consciousness. The Identity Theory as presented herein is plausible and leads to major revisions in concepts and their terminologies relating to consciousness: Memory items are regarded as semi-independent rather than as only hierarchical. The concept of representations is revised. It can be seen that the...
Abstract For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the exphnatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, "experiential" properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms...