Journal of Consciousness Studies
December 1, 2022
Nathaniel F. Barrett
When examined closely, our experience of affect presents a special challenge: it seems that there is no common quality that marks the pleasantness of conscious states and feelings. The implications of this finding have been debated by philosophers and psychologists for more than a century, and yet the peculiar phenomenology of affect is rarely discussed within consciousness studies. The purpose...
Material Religion
July 3, 2018
Nathaniel F. Barrett
1 citation
"Enactivist approaches to the cognitive science of religion." Material Religion, 14(3), pp. 415–416
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy
May 1, 2011
Nathaniel F. Barrett
2 citations
Book Review| May 01 2011 Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind, Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes. Nathaniel F. Barrett Nathaniel F. Barrett Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google American Journal of Theology & Philosophy (2011) 32 (2):...
chromatikon
2010
Nathaniel F. Barrett, Les Éditions Chromatika
For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, experiential properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the...
Process Studies
October 1, 2009
Nathaniel F. Barrett
Abstract For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the exphnatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, "experiential" properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms...