AbstractIn this chapter, it is assumed that, in order for the debate over extended cognition (and mind) to have substance, there must be a genuine distinction between what is cognitive and what is not. This motivates the search for a mark of the cognitive, a principle demarcating the cognitive. Desiderata for a principle of demarcation are set out. Various principles supportive of the extended...
AbstractThis chapter explores two routes from phenomenology to extended cognition. One appeals directly to the contents of conscious experience, for example, the subject's sense of having an extended body under certain conditions. It is argued that the best account of such results is an error theory, one that appeals to neural representations of body, self, and the environment; the general...
AbstractThis chapter addresses a realization-based interpretation of the extended approach. On this view, cognitive states are states of an organismically bounded cognitive system, yet may still have realizers—that is, physical implementations—that extend beyond the boundary of the organism. Functionalism in philosophy of mind, as well as the associated idea of a physical realization, is...