6 papers in the library · publishing 2025-2026
A Sense of the Possible July 9, 2026 Jonathan Mitchell
Abstract This chapter provides the reader with two things that are helpful in orientating them for what is to come across the study. In the first instance it provides a substantive reconstruction of the notion of an intentional horizon. Secondly, it offers theoretical background, motivation, and defence for the approach to the study of perceptual experience that is taken in the book, namely one...
June 5, 2026 Jonathan Mitchell
Abstract This chapter considers a view of the intentional horizons of spatial perception which make the subject’s actions central. More specifically, it considers a view—strongly associated with Alva Noë and enactivism—that posits a constitutive connection between action and spatial perception, whereby spatial perception is constituted by the exercise of a range of sensorimotor skills. I call...
June 5, 2026 Jonathan Mitchell
Abstract In the first of two chapters dedicated to Modal-Ability view, this chapter articulates the view. While the view is introduced as a distinctive and original proposal, it draws on key ideas discussed across the study, such as ability awareness, the visual background, and the visual potential of objects. The central claim of the view is that the intentional horizons of spatial perception...
June 5, 2026 Jonathan Mitchell
Abstract This chapter applies the Master Argument for Horizonal Intentionality to spatial perception, that is our visual experiences as of three-dimensional objects. It details what the ‘objective sense’ of spatial perception amounts to and how the explicit component falls short of that sense. This involves a detailed discussion of what the explicit component of spatial perception consists in....
Synthese January 28, 2026 Jonathan Mitchell
Abstract A topic of interest in the philosophy of perception concerns similarities and differences between the senses. One way of approaching this issue is to focus on structural differences. An interesting question in this respect concerns whether, and in what respect, perceptual modalities other than vision might possess a spatial field which is in some respects similar to the visual field....
European Journal of Philosophy June 1, 2025 Jonathan Mitchell
AbstractIn The Imaginary Jean‐Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience ‐ I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross‐modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to...