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Intentional Horizons and Phenomenology

Jonathan Mitchell

A Sense of the Possible July 9, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198998990.003.0002 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that perceptual experience is best understood through a phenomenological approach centered on the 'intentional horizon,' and introduces the 'Master Argument for Horizonal Intentionality' as a key support for this view.

Abstract

Abstract This chapter provides the reader with two things that are helpful in orientating them for what is to come across the study. In the first instance it provides a substantive reconstruction of the notion of an intentional horizon. Secondly, it offers theoretical background, motivation, and defence for the approach to the study of perceptual experience that is taken in the book, namely one that can be called phenomenological. It also introduces the reader to the Master Argument for Horizonal Intentionality. Finally, it provides remarks on the very idea of ‘intentional analysis’, and defends the phenomenological approach against some recent criticisms.

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