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Consciousness, Theories of

Uriah Kriegel

Philosophy Compass 2006 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00008.x (opens in new tab)

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Key findings Argues that theories of consciousness attempt to account for phenomenal character, and surveys prominent theories with special attention to representational theories that explain phenomenal character in terms of representational content.

Abstract

Abstract Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience's phenomenal character . Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently prominent theories, paying special attention to the various attempts to explain a state's phenomenal character in terms of its representational content.

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