Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument
Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003 DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2003.10716537 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 190 |
| Key points | Argues that the ambiguity of 'consciousness' can be addressed by introducing the technical term 'intransitive self-consciousness' to denote a specific form of self-awareness. |
Abstract
The word ‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it isnota term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I am going to discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities of the word ‘consciousness,’ I will introduce a term of art:intransitive self-consciousness.As the term suggests, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of self-consciousness, or self-awareness.
Citations in the library
Cited by 30
- Consciousness and false HOTs Philosophical Psychology October 1, 2010
- The Who and the How of Experience Oxford University Press eBooks December 1, 2010
- Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness September 17, 2024
- Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation Philosophical Studies February 1, 2011
- Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition November 1, 2024
and 25 more in the library
Cites 5
- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks March 26, 1996
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Higher‐order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Advances in Consciousness Research March 20, 1996