Verbal Disputes in the Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious states, i.e. the conditions under which a mental state is conscious rather than unconscious.There are two main broad approaches: The Higher-Order approach and the First-Order approach.Higher-Order theories claim that a mental state is conscious only if it is the object of a suitable state of higher-order awareness.First-Order theories reject this necessary condition.However, both sides make the following claim: for any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious iff there is something it is like for S to be in M.This is the Nagelian Conception of consciousness.Taking the Nagelian Conception as a starting point, I contend that the best rationalizing explanation for the ways in which Higher-Order and First-Order theorists contribute to their dispute is to see those contributions as consistent responses to two distinct questions.If we agree . . .not to worry about which mental phenomena deserve the honorific title 'consciousness,' it may seem that there is nothing left about which Block and I disagree.We might even agree to apply the term 'conscious,' in a special sense, to states that exhibit only thin phenomenality.