The Phenomenal Character of Consciousness

Abstract

Abstract This chapter focuses on phenomenal consciousness. The starting assumption is Nagel’s observation that consciousness, in particular the phenomenal appearances that accompany conscious mental states, are only there from the perspective of the relevant subject and are somehow involved in the subject’s being a perspective on the world. While it’s common to understand the notion of there being something it is like to undergo conscious mental states in terms of certain special properties, qualia, I understand consciousness in terms of the notion of phenomenal appearance and the fact that appearances obtain relative to subjects. The aim here is to find the best way to describe the mental phenomenon of consciousness as such, capturing how it’s subjective and how a full description of phenomenally conscious mental states is a description from the standpoint of the subject having the relevant mental states. I will not discuss the mind–body problem of how consciousness relates to our physical makeup. As in the case of the passage of time, we first need to find a proper delineation of the phenomenon before we are in a position to attempt (reductive) explanations of it.