The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness
Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.11dra (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person aspect of experience—poses a challenge for scientific explanation due to its private and special knowability. |
Abstract
The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience. This ‘phenomenal’ aspect of consciousness seems to be subjective, private, and knowable in a special way, making it difficult to reconcile with the scientific focus on objective, third-person data. This introduction provides an overview of phenomenal consciousness, explores philosophical arguments about its nature, and considers whether or not we should expect to find an explanation for the properties of phenomenal consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cites 6
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks March 26, 1996
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum Noûs June 1, 1994
- The Constitution of Visual Consciousness Advances in Consciousness Research August 28, 2013
and 1 more in the library