The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness
Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.11dra (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractConsciousness research advances, but the 'phenomenal' aspect—the first-person, subjective feel of experience—remains hard to explain. This aspect appears private and knowable in a special way, clashing with science's objective, third-person methods. The introduction surveys phenomenal consciousness, philosophical arguments about its nature, and whether an explanation for its properties should be expected.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key finding | Argues that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person aspect of experience—poses a challenge for scientific explanation due to its private and special knowability. |
Abstract
The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience. This ‘phenomenal’ aspect of consciousness seems to be subjective, private, and knowable in a special way, making it difficult to reconcile with the scientific focus on objective, third-person data. This introduction provides an overview of phenomenal consciousness, explores philosophical arguments about its nature, and considers whether or not we should expect to find an explanation for the properties of phenomenal consciousness.