Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness
January 31, 2024 DOI: 10.1017/9781009317344 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractMany philosophers and theorists believe consciousness is purely physical, but a significant minority defend non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism, and panpsychism. These non-physicalists argue that fully explaining consciousness or capturing what it is like to be in conscious states (like seeing red or feeling pain) in physical terms may be impossible. This Element introduces the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness, explains the most important arguments for them, and considers how each responds to scientific and other arguments supporting physicalism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that non-physicalist theories of consciousness, such as dualism, idealism, and panpsychism, offer responses to physicalist arguments, motivated by the difficulty of explaining subjective experience in purely physical terms. |
Abstract
Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. This Element will introduce the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness and explain the most important arguments for them, and consider how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.