A philosophical critique argues that the 'Superpsychism' theory—which proposes that space-time and ordinary consciousness both emerge from a fundamental level of reality composed of maximally coherent quantum entanglement relations called prototime that instantiate a basic form of consciousness termed superconsciousness—faces significant objections. The authors question whether this view offers genuine explanatory advantages as an account of space-time, an interpretation of quantum mechanics, or a theory of consciousness, finding it lacking in each area.
A philosophical critique challenges Michael Pelczar's defense of phenomenalism—the view that material objects are logical constructions out of actual and possible sense experiences. The critic argues that phenomenalism is not simpler than rival theories, as Pelczar claims, and in some respects is actually less simple. Russellian panpsychism, which holds that physical objects are mind-dependent, is defended against Pelczar's objections. The critic further contends that phenomenalism lacks an adequate account of mental causation, placing it at a disadvantage compared to Russellian panpsychism as a theory of consciousness.
If panpsychism—the view that all things are associated with consciousness—is true, it may imply that egoism, or bias toward what we normally consider the self, is not only immoral but fundamentally irrational or imprudent. The author argues that panpsychism suggests a sense in which 'we are all one,' challenging the rational basis for prioritizing one's own interests over others. This practical or ethical implication extends the philosophical theory beyond the mind–body problem into questions of how we ought to live.
Many philosophers and theorists believe consciousness is purely physical, but a significant minority defend non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism, and panpsychism. These non-physicalists argue that fully explaining consciousness or capturing what it is like to be in conscious states (like seeing red or feeling pain) in physical terms may be impossible. This Element introduces the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness, explains the most important arguments for them, and considers how each responds to scientific and other arguments supporting physicalism.