Is Phenomenalism Superior to Russellian Panpsychism as a Theory of Consciousness and Matter?

A philosophical critique challenges Michael Pelczar's defense of phenomenalism—the view that material objects are logical constructions out of actual and possible sense experiences. The critic argues that phenomenalism is not simpler than rival theories, as Pelczar claims, and in some respects is actually less simple. Russellian panpsychism, which holds that physical objects are mind-dependent, is defended against Pelczar's objections. The critic further contends that phenomenalism lacks an adequate account of mental causation, placing it at a disadvantage compared to Russellian panpsychism as a theory of consciousness.

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Abstract

In Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (2023), Michael Pelczar argues that phenomenalism offers a superior account both of the nature of matter and of the relation between matter and consciousness, compared to traditional, Kantian and structural realism (when it comes to matter) and traditional materialism, traditional dualism and Russellian panpsychism (when it comes to consciousness), mainly because phenomenalism is simpler than these other theories while retaining the same explanatory power. In response, I argue that phenomenalism is not really simpler than other theories, in the main respects that Pelczar considers, and in some further respects he does not consider, it is actually less simple. I will also defend Russellian panpsychism (which like phenomenalism offers a theory of both matter and consciousness) against the charge that unlike phenomenalism, it renders physical objects mind-dependent. Furthermore, phenomenalism lacks an account of mental causation. This puts it at a clear disadvantage relative to Russellian panpsychism especially, considered as a theory of consciousness.