Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 561 |
| Key points | Argues that a realistic materialist, who holds that consciousness is wholly physical, must be a panpsychist, because consciousness cannot arise from matter that is entirely non-conscious in its intrinsic nature. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses the following statements: a materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material and a realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. Therefore it follows that a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute consciousness. The chapter asks: what follows from this? It must be assumed in a standard way that all matter is made of the same stuff (leptons and quarks, or strings, or...) and it must follow that all matter can be arranged in a consciousness-constituting way. It is then argues that for certain things A, you cannot get A from non-A, and that consciousness is one of those things. Therefore no matter can be wholly non-conscious in its ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ nature. If so, any realistic — any truly serious — materialist must be a panpsychist.