Physicalism vs. Dualism: Can Consciousness Be Fully Explained by Physical Science?

Abstract

This paper examines the enduring metaphysical and epistemological problem of consciousness through physicalism and dualism. Physicalism, supported by extensive neuroscientific evidence, maintains that consciousness is entirely contingent upon or identical to physiological processes. Empirical findings from neuroimaging, brain injury studies, and psychoactive modulation support a systematic dependence of mental phenomena on neural substrates. However, the “hard problem of consciousness” exposes an explanatory gap between physical descriptions and phenomenal experience. Jackson’s knowledge argument and the philosophical zombie’s argument underscore this gap, suggesting that physicalist accounts may be ontologically incomplete. Dualism, while preserving the irreducibility of qualia, is hard to explain the mind-body interaction and concord with the physical principle of causal closure. Alternative frameworks, including panpsychism and illusionism, attempt to reconcile these tensions but introduce new conceptual challenges. The paper concludes that neither paradigm offers a wholly satisfactory account of consciousness. A comprehensive resolution may require a radical reconsideration of both the physical and the mental. This would resemble the paradigm shifts represented by quantum theory. Consciousness, therefore, remains the unresolved problem at the intersection of philosophy, neuroscience, and metaphysics.