Consciousness in scientific and folk psychology

Abstract

The intentional properties and subjective qualities of conscious states pose special problems for physicalism. Yet 'consciousness' is a term of the vernacular that picks out such a heterogeneous group of phenomena that it will not be a good explanandum for science. This thesis adopted the position that we are licensed to theorize about the phenomena of consciousness, provided we are careful to dump all excess folk-psychological baggage surrounding the term. It was argued that the purposes and goals of folk psychology differ considerably from those of scientific psychology, for folk psychology is first and foremost a craft. Cognitive psychology is bound to the analytical strategy by way of functionalism. Various forms of functionalism were investigated, and two non­ mutually exclusive versions were favoured: homuncular functionalism and microfunctionalism. This led to the view that nature is multi-levelled, and therefore that functionalism may be better known as structural-functional theory. S-F theory should seek to explain the processes and structures of the mind­ brain, rather than attempt to find the states posited by folk psychology within the cognitive system. Traditional cognitive models view the mind as a highly structured system of semi-autonomous processors under the monitoring and guidance of a central executive. But this thesis argued that to postulate a 'consciousness module', while a natural extension of functionalist 'boxology', is merely to pander to our folk-psychological intuitions of the will or 'inner self'. Some of the 'new wave' of cognitive models -those that do not posit an executive -were reviewed. Phenomenal consciousness is the one major stumbling block for physicalist theories. Although this thesis agreed that qualia do not exist, it was evident that no theory has yet provided a bridge across the explanatory gap between third-person science and first-person phenomenology over which sceptics feel safe to cross. Nevertheless, it was argued that Dennett's (1991a) latest theory, with its intelligent use of metaphors and analogies, is one of the most promising steps in the right direction. Finally, it was argued throughout that an interdisciplinary approach is crucial if science is to uncover the mysteries of consciousness.