Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned.
Peter Carruthers, Bénédicte Veillet
Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.07.008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Access consciousness Amodal experience Cognitive phenomenology Phenomenal consciousness Zombie |
| Citations | 43 |
| Key points | Argues that the debate over cognitive phenomenology should be realigned as a distinction between non-conceptual and alleged conceptual or propositional phenomenology, and defends three varieties of non-sensory non-conceptual phenomenology. |
Abstract
This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal)1 non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 7
- Comparative psychology without consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2018
- Cognitive Phenomenology Neuroscience and Computation Cognitive Computation May 17, 2023
- The need for a theory November 28, 2019
- Phenomenal Intentionality The Quality of Thought January 11, 2024
- Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology. Erkenntnis December 9, 2021
and 2 more in the library
Cites 9
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Ten Problems of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 17, 1995
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences July 1, 2010
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
and 4 more in the library