Cognitive access and cognitive phenomenology: conceptual and empirical issues
Philosophical Explorations May 3, 2016 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2016.1176235 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that if cognitive access mechanisms can be disentangled from those producing phenomenology in perception and emotion, the same should apply to thoughts, posing a dilemma for the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either inaccessible cognitive phenomenology exists or cognitive phenomenology is doubtful. Concludes that defenders of the thesis have nothing to fear from this distinction and speculates it may even support their position. |
Abstract
The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss and explore the conceptual and empirical problems for assessing this disjunction, and conclude that defenders of the cognitive phenomenology thesis have nothing to fear from this distinction. I finish by speculating on how it might, in turn, speak in favor of the cognitive phenomenology thesis.
Comparable studies
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| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 9
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences July 1, 2010
- Rich conscious perception outside focal attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2014
- The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience January 3, 2014
- The myth of phenomenological overflow. Consciousness and Cognition July 22, 2011
and 4 more in the library