Phenomenal Intentionality
David Pitt
The Quality of Thought January 11, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198789901.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Dretske-inspired causal-informational-teleological theories of conceptual intentionality face problems due to their exclusion of subjective aspects of intentionality, and that a phenomenal-intentionalist, internalist approach avoids these problems. Offers two arguments for internalism about thought content: one from the possibility of propositional hallucination and one from the impossibility of propositional illusion. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter presents a series of problems for Dretske-inspired causal-informational-teleological theories of conceptual intentionality, which I take to be the best hope for the naturalization of intentionality. It argues that these problems arise from the exclusion of the subjective aspects of intentionality, and that the phenomenal-intentionalist approach avoids them. This approach is resolutely internalist, and as such is very much against the grain of recent mainstream analytic philosophy of mind (and language). The chapter presents two arguments for internalism about thought content, one based on the possibility of propositional hallucination, and one based on the impossibility of propositional illusion.
Citations in the library
Cites 11
- Phenomenal Externalism or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? Philosophical Issues 1996
- Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 2007
- Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned. Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2017
- A hundred years of consciousness: “a long training in absurdity” Estudios de Filosofía 2019
- Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness Phenomenology and Mind 2022
and 6 more in the library