How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis.
Sid Kouider, Vincent De Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur, Emmanuel Dupoux
Trends in Cognitive Sciences July 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 477 |
| Key points | Proposes that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not empirically supported and should be replaced by a hierarchical model of access with partial awareness. |
Abstract
Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between 'phenomenal' consciousness (rich) and 'access' consciousness (limited). Here, we argue that the empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is equivocal, resulting either from a confusion between phenomenal and unconscious contents, or from an impression of phenomenally rich experiences arising from illusory contents. We propose a refined account of access that relies on a hierarchy of representational levels and on the notion of partial awareness, whereby lower and higher levels are accessed independently. Reframing of the issue of dissociable forms of consciousness into dissociable levels of access provides a more parsimonious account of the existing evidence. In addition, the rich phenomenology illusion can be studied and described in terms of testable cognitive mechanisms.