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On the Phenomenology of Thought

Joseph Levine

Oxford Scholarship Online April 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198800088.003.0004 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that among the two principal arguments for cognitive phenomenology, the self-knowledge argument is question-begging and should be rejected, while the phenomenological or "phenomenal contrast" argument succeeds. Consequently, only one of the weaker versions of the position that cognitive phenomenology exists is supported.

Abstract

In this paper I address the debate over the existence and nature of “cognitive phenomenology,” the alleged contribution to phenomenal consciousness made by non-sensory, cognitive states. I distinguish various versions of the position that there is cognitive phenomenology, evaluate what I take to be the two principal arguments for its existence, and then conclude that only one of the weaker versions is supported by the argument that survives criticism. The two principal arguments are the self-knowledge argument and the phenomenological argument, also known as the “phenomenal contrast” argument. While I endorse the latter, I argue that the former is ultimately question-begging. I end with some speculative considerations.

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