Skip to content

Greg Janzen

4 papers in the library · 229 citations · publishing 2005-2011

Papers

Sort Most recent Most cited

IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE

The Southern Journal of Philosophy September 1, 2011 Greg Janzen 28 citations

abstract It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there beingsomething it is likefor the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states:...

The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness

Advances in Consciousness Research March 27, 2008 Greg Janzen

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, “implicit” awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it....

Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character

Dialogue 2005 Greg Janzen

ABSTRACTThis article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it....