Phenomenalism
November 24, 2022
Michael Pelczar
Abstract: Chapter 8 offers a phenomenalist perspective on the problem of consciousness, arguing that phenomenalism faciliates a more satisfying view of the relationship between mind and body than we can obtain on any other terms.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Michael Pelczar
Metaphysical idealism is the mirror-image of physicalism about the mental: where physicalists contend that the mental facts of our world supervene on the physical facts (but not vice versa), idealists contend that the physical facts of our world supervene on the mental facts (but not vice versa). Like physicalism, idealism is a kind of monism. According to idealists, the fundamental features of...
Noûs
October 30, 2019
Michael Pelczar
We review existing strategies for bringing modal intuitions to bear against materialist theories of consciousness, and then propose a new strategy. Unlike existing strategies, which assume that imagination (suitably constrained) is a good guide to modal truth, the strategy proposed here makes no assumptions about the probative value of imag-ination. However, unlike traditional modal arguments,...
September 19, 2017
Michael Pelczar
3 citations
David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness from the easy problems of consciousness. Answering the easy questions might constrain the project of finding out what time is, as answering the question whether rainbows touch the ground might constrain the project of figuring out what rainbows are. The analogy between the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of time...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
March 1, 2008
Cecilia Wee, Michael Pelczar
AbstractAfter drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience)—we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is...