Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”
The Southern Journal of Philosophy August 30, 2023 DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12532 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self, and that this problem is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social. |
Abstract
Abstract I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.