Levinas's Philosophy of Perception
Matt E. M. Bower
The Southern Journal of Philosophy December 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12260 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Levinas's account of perceptual experience is underappreciated in philosophy of mind, that it departs from Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological treatments of perception, and that it fits among present-day views as a form of naive realism. |
Abstract
Abstract Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how it fits in among presently available views about the nature of perceptual experience, namely, as a form of naïve realism.
Citations in the library
Cites 4
- Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences December 24, 2016
- Visual Phenomenology The MIT Press September 21, 2017
- The Phenomenological Mind December 22, 2007
- The Significance of Consciousness July 27, 1998