The Nietzschean Sellars: Remarks on the Nietzsche‐Sellars view of mind
The Southern Journal of Philosophy July 9, 2024 DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12581 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Nietzsche's picture of consciousness is essentially the same as Sellars's view of conceptually structured thought: both treat structured thinking as a linguistic phenomenon whose structure arises contingently from social interactions within a community, and both give mentalistic vocabulary a special role in reflectively engaging with others' mental states. The authors argue this parallel extends to their views on perception. |
Abstract
We discuss the striking similarities between Friedrich Nietzsche's and Wilfrid Sellars's respective philosophies of mind. Drawing especially on recent Nietzsche scholarship by Riccardi and Katsafanas, we argue that the Nietzschean picture of consciousness is essentially the same as Sellars's view of conceptually structured thought. In particular, we argue that both consider structured thinking to be a linguistic phenomenon whose structure, in turn, arises contingently from social interactions within a community. Further, both views provide for a special role to be played by specifically mentalistic vocabulary, making it possible to engage with the mental states of others in a reflective way. We also discuss how this parallel extends to their respective views on perception. Drawing on O'Shea and Riccardi, we argue for interpretations on which there still is a clear connection between their respective views. Finally, we end the article by discussing some reasons why this similarity should not be as unexpected as it initially seems.