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Caleb Liang

4 papers in the library · 25 citations · publishing 2008-2025

Papers

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Double body effect induced by integrating proprioceptive-vestibular and visual information.

iScience November 21, 2025 Caleb Liang, Wen-Hsiang Lin, Wei-Kai Liou et al.

Most studies in bodily self-consciousness were limited to the case of a single body. We performed VR experiments to test the hypothesis that it is possible for healthy subjects to experience the Double Body Effect-the experiential combination of double body ownership and double body-location. Under proprioceptive-vestibular and visual manipulations, participants wobbled involuntarily while...

DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2025.113819 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Behavioral neuroscience Cognitive neuroscience Human-computer interaction Body perception

Body-as-Subject in the Four-Hand Illusion

Frontiers in Psychology September 19, 2018 Caleb Liang, Yen-Tung Lee, Wen-Yeo Chen et al. 1 citation

In a recent study (Chen et al., 2018), we conducted a series of experiments that induced the "four-hand illusion": using a head-mounted display (HMD), the participant adopted the experimenter's first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP. The participant saw four hands via the HMD: the experimenter's two hands from the adopted 1PP and the subject's own two hands from the adopted...

Self-Consciousness and Immunity

The Journal of Philosophy 2011 Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang 24 citations

Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject...

Higher‐Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation

The Southern Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2008 Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang

AbstractCurrently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher‐order‐thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one‐component and a two‐component view. We further argue that the two‐component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the...