Going Mental: Why Physicalism Should Not Posit Inscrutable Properties
Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy November 24, 2024 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-024-00894-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that appealing to 'incrutables'—properties not revealed by physical inquiry—is not a successful strategy for maintaining physicalism, because such properties likely violate physicalism's conditions, lend greater support to panpsychism, and are of uncertain physical status. Physicalists should instead revisit and defeat arguments that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties. |
Abstract
Some philosophers argue that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties and that, therefore, physicalism ought to be rejected. There are philosophers who feel the force of this challenge but who wish to maintain their physicalism. They suggest that mentality is grounded in inscrutable properties or ‘incrutables’: properties that are not revealed through physical enquiry but that do not violate physicalism. Our analysis reveals that appealing to inscrutables is not a successful strategy for these physicalists, for the following reasons: first, inscrutables likely do violate the conditions of physicalism; second, inscrutables lend greater support to panpsychism than physicalism; third, there is good reason to be agnostic as to whether or not inscrutables count as physical properties. Each of these reasons undermines the physicalist’s purpose in positing inscrutables. If one wishes to remain a physicalist, they ought to direct their philosophical analysis and energies toward revisiting and defeasing the arguments that purport to show that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties.