Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation?

Russellian panpsychism, a version of panpsychism that combines mental and physical properties at a fundamental level, is often claimed to be superior to other non-physicalist theories because it can integrate consciousness into the causal order and explain mental causation. This paper argues that this claimed superiority is illusory. On one interpretation, the explanation offered does not address the actual phenomenon at stake in the mental causation debate. On another, it addresses the right phenomenon but competing accounts can provide analogous explanations without the counterintuitive commitments of panpsychism. Thus, explaining mental causation does not give Russellian panpsychism an advantage.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In the contemporary literature on panpsychism, one often finds the claim that a Russellian-monist version of panpsychism, i.e., Russellian panpsychism, is a superior view compared to alternative non-physicalist theories. The argument for this claim is that while Russellian panpsychism can integrate consciousness in the causal order and explain mental causation, alternative theories fail to do so. If this is correct, panpsychism deserves its place as a main contender in solving the mind-body problem. In this paper, I argue that Russellian panpsychism’s superiority in explaining mental causation over competing accounts is illusory. On one reading, the proposed explanation is not an explanation of the phenomenon that is at stake in the mental causation debate. On an alternative reading, it is an explanation of the right phenomenon, but analogous explanations are available to competing accounts with less counterintuitive commitments. While there may be other considerations supporting panpsychism, explaining mental causation is not one.