Phenomenally Skilful Intuitions

Skilful intuitions are those produced through deliberate mental actions guided by metacognitive awareness, rather than merely having a distinctive feeling or phenomenology. Phenomenalist views that define intuitions by their unique subjective character cannot explain why some intuitions are more reliable than others. The key problem is understanding how intuitions can be about something (intentional presence) in a way that admits of skill. Drawing on empirical research on metacognition and action control, an enactivist approach—which treats intuition as a kind of mental action—solves this problem by showing that skilful intuitions result from practiced, self-regulated cognitive processes that can be trained and refined.

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Abstract

Abstract What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first argue that prominent phenomenalist views of intuition—which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology—cannot capture the distinction between skilful and unskilful intuitions. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of intuitive presence . Lastly, I draw on extensive empirical work on metacognition and action control to argue that an enactivist view of intuition—which emphasises the role of mental actions in producing intuitions—both satisfies the proposed desideratum and offers a clear and plausible account of the nature of skilful intuition.