Some Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identity
Ivar Labukt
Erkenntnis August 17, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00722-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal accounts of personal identity, which rely on continuity in the capacity for consciousness to explain survival through dreamless sleep, face serious problems: thought experiments suggest such continuity is neither sufficient nor necessary for survival, and proposed modifications lead to equally serious difficulties. |
Abstract
Abstract I present some problems for phenomenal (i.e. consciousness-based) accounts of personal identity and egoistic concern. These accounts typically rely on continuity in the capacity for consciousness to explain how we survive ordinary periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep. I offer some thought experiments where continuity in the capacity for consciousness does not seem sufficient for survival and some where it does not seem necessary. There are ways of modifying the standard phenomenal approach so as to avoid these difficulties, but I argue that they all lead to other problems that are no less serious.