Individuating Artificial Minds

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues that if an artificial system realizes consciousness, then it’s likely to realize not just one, but many independent minds at once. This view is motivated by analogy to split-brain cases, in which the two hemispheres of a patient’s brain are functionally disconnected. While there are several ways to interpret this phenomenon, it’s highly plausible that split-brain patients have two distinct minds—one per hemisphere. If functional disconnection within a single biological brain can generate multiple minds, then we should say the same about artificial conscious systems, where such disconnections are likely to be even more extreme. Thus, each instance of an overarching artificial conscious system (e.g., a particular user’s distinct, functionally independent interaction with that system) will realize an independent mind, leading to a radical multiplicity of artificial minds. This carries several ethical implications for AI design and system updating. Moreover, it introduces the prospect that human interests may soon find themselves overwhelmed in the moral calculus by an enormous number of artificial minds.