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Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences

ISSN 1471-2970, 0962-8436

98 papers in the library · 3,405 citations · publishing 1996-2026

Papers

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Psilocybin-assisted neurofeedback for the improvement of executive functions: a randomized semi-naturalistic-lab feasibility study

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences October 21, 2024 Stefanie Enriquez‐geppert, Jaroslav Krc, Fiachra O'Higgins et al. 5 citations

Executive function deficits, common in psychiatric disorders, hinder daily activities and may be linked to diminished neural plasticity, affecting treatment and training responsiveness. In this pioneering study, we evaluated the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of psilocybin-assisted frontal-midline theta neurofeedback (NF), a neuromodulation technique leveraging neuroplasticity, to improve...

The N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor hypothesis of ketamine's antidepressant action: evidence and controversies.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences July 29, 2024 Yihao Jiang, Yiyan Dong, Hailan Hu

Substantial clinical evidence has unravelled the superior antidepressant efficacy of ketamine: in comparison to traditional antidepressants targeting the monoamine systems, ketamine, as an N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor (NMDAR) antagonist, acts much faster and more potently. Surrounding the antidepressant mechanisms of ketamine, there is ample evidence supporting an NMDAR-antagonism-based...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2023.0225 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Nmdar hypothesis Nmdar inhibitors Antidepressant efficacy Depression treatment +4

Predicting instabilities: an embodied perspective on unstable experiences with art and design.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences January 29, 2024 Claudia Muth, Claus-Christian Carbon 11 citations

Predictive Processing (PP) provides a theoretical framework that describes perception as a process attempting to increase the predictability of stimulations by updating predictions or exploring new sensations. Moreover, perception and action are assumed to be closely linked within this process. While organisms seem to strive for predictability, we sometimes expose ourselves to objects and...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0416 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Ambiguity Art experience Embodiment Enactivism +2

Designs on consciousness: literature and predictive processing.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences January 29, 2024 Karin Kukkonen 6 citations

Predictive processing is a recent approach in cognitive science that describes the brain as an engine of probabilistic hierarchical inference. Initially proposed as a general theory of brain function, predictive processing has recently been expanding to account for questions of consciousness in philosophy and neuroscience. In my previous work (Kukkonen 2020 Probability designs: literature and...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0423 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Consciousness Embodied cognition Literature Predictive processing

Interpersonal attunement in social interactions: from collective psychophysiology to inter-personalized psychiatry and beyond.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences February 13, 2023 Dimitris Bolis, Guillaume Dumas, Leonhard Schilbach 71 citations

In this article, we analyse social interactions, drawing on diverse points of views, ranging from dialectics, second-person neuroscience and enactivism to dynamical systems, active inference and machine learning. To this end, we define interpersonal attunement as a set of multi-scale processes of building up and materializing social expectations-put simply, anticipating and interacting with...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0365 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Collective psychophysiology Culture Inter-personalized psychiatry Interpersonal attunement +2

The division of linguistic labour for offloading conceptual understanding.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences February 13, 2023 Edgar J Andrade-Lotero, Julián M Ortiz-Duque, Javier A Velasco-García et al.

The division of linguistic labour (DLL), initially theorized by philosophers, has gained the attention of cognitive scientists in the last decade. Contrary to some controversial philosophical accounts of DLL, we propose that it is an extended mind strategy of offloading conceptual understanding onto other people. In this article, we empirically explore this proposal by providing an exploratory...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0360 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Cognitive artefacts Community of knowledge Extended mind Group cognition +1

Is love an abstract concept? A view of concepts from an interaction-based perspective.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 26, 2022 Joanna Rączaszek-leonardi, Julian Zubek

Research concerning concepts in the cognitive sciences has been dominated by the information-processing approach, which has resulted in a certain narrowing of the range of questions and methods of investigation. Recent trends have sought to broaden the scope of such research, but they have not yet been integrated within a theoretical framework that would allow us to reconcile new perspectives...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0356 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Humans Love Concept formation Cognitive science +5

Rethinking the role of language in embodied cognition

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 26, 2022 Guy Dove

There has been a lot of recent interest in the way that language might enhance embodied cognition. This interest is driven in large part by a growing body of evidence implicating the language system in various aspects of semantic memory—including, but not limited to, its apparent contribution to abstract concepts. In this essay, I develop and defend a novel account of the cognitive role played...

From pictures to reality: modelling the phenomenology and psychophysics of 3D perception.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 13, 2022 Dhanraj Vishwanath

The dominant inferential approach to human 3D perception assumes a model of spatial encoding based on a physical description of objects and space. Prevailing models based on this physicalist approach assume that the visual system infers an objective, unitary and mostly veridical representation of the external world. However, careful consideration of the phenomenology of 3D perception challenges...

An evolutionary perspective on chordate brain organization and function: insights from amphioxus, and the problem of sentience.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences February 14, 2022 Thurston Lacalli

The similarities between amphioxus and vertebrate brains, in their regional subdivision, cell types and circuitry, make the former a useful benchmark for understanding the evolutionary innovations that shaped the latter. Locomotory control systems were already well developed in basal chordates, with the ventral neuropile of the dien-mesencephalon serving to set levels of activity and initiate...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0520 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Chimaera hypothesis Dien-mesencephalon Optimizing qualia Pars anterodorsalis

Virtual reality training of lucid dreaming.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences February 1, 2021 Jarrod Gott, Leonore Bovy, Emma Peters et al. 33 citations

Metacognitive reflections on one's current state of mind are largely absent during dreaming. Lucid dreaming as the exception to this rule is a rare phenomenon; however, its occurrence can be facilitated through cognitive training. A central idea of respective training strategies is to regularly question one's phenomenal experience: is the currently experienced world real, or just a dream? Here,...

Offline perception: an introduction.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 14, 2020 Peter Fazekas, Bence Nánay, Joel Pearson

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different...

Hallucinations on demand: the utility of experimentally induced phenomena in hallucination research.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 14, 2020 Sebastian Rogers, Rebecca Keogh, Joel Pearson

Despite the desire to delve deeper into hallucinations of all types, methodological obstacles have frustrated development of more rigorous quantitative experimental techniques, thereby hampering research progress. Here, we discuss these obstacles and, with reference to visual phenomena, argue that experimentally induced phenomena (e.g. hallucinations induced by flickering light and classical...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0233 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Humans Hallucinations Photic stimulation Consciousness +3

Unconscious mental imagery.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 14, 2020 Bence Nánay

Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state-as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery-including the most famous ones-do not actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0689 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Humans Consciousness Imagination Visual perception +4

How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep–wake cycle

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 13, 2020 Jennifer Windt 56 citations

Whether we are awake or asleep is believed to mark a sharp divide between the types of conscious states we undergo in either behavioural state. Consciousness in sleep is often equated with dreaming and thought to be characteristically different from waking consciousness. Conversely, recent research shows that we spend a substantial amount of our waking lives mind wandering, or lost in...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0696 (opens in new tab) Wakefulness Consciousness Mind-wandering Sleep system call +5

Comparing the phenomenological qualities of stimulus-independent thought, stimulus-dependent thought and dreams using experience sampling

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 13, 2020 Madeleine E. Gross, Anna Smith, Yvette M. Graveline et al. 37 citations

Humans spend a considerable portion of their lives engaged in 'stimulus-independent thoughts' (SIT), or mental activity that occurs independently of input from the immediate external environment. Although such SITs are, by definition, different from thoughts that are driven by stimuli in one's external environment (i.e. stimulus-dependent thoughts; SDTs), at times, the phenomenology of these...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0694 (opens in new tab) Stimulus psychology Optimal distinctiveness theory Cognitive psychology Perception +4

Out of the blue: understanding abrupt and wayward transitions in thought using probability and predictive processing

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 13, 2020 Caitlin Mills, Andre Zamani, Rebecca White et al. 27 citations

Thoughts that appear to come to us ‘out of the blue’ or ‘out of nowhere’ are a familiar aspect of mental experience. Such thoughts tend to elicit feelings of surprise and spontaneity. Although we are beginning to understand the neural processes that underlie the arising of such thoughts, little is known about what accounts for their peculiar phenomenology. Here, we focus on one central aspect...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0692 (opens in new tab) Surprise Phenomenology philosophy Perception Feeling +6

Hallucination, imagery, dreaming: reassembling stimulus-independent perceptions based on Edmund Parish's classic misperception framework

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 13, 2020 Flavie Waters, Joseph M Barnby, Jan Dirk Blom 26 citations

Within the broad field of human perception lies the category of stimulus-independent perceptions, which draws together experiences such as hallucinations, mental imagery and dreams. Traditional divisions between medical and psychological sciences have contributed to these experiences being investigated separately. This review aims to examine their similarities and differences at the levels of...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0701 (opens in new tab) Perception Stimulus psychology Phenomenology philosophy Mental image +4

Neurophenomenology of induced and natural synaesthesia.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 9, 2019 David J. Schwartzman, Daniel Bor, Nicolas Rothen et al. 7 citations

People with synaesthesia have additional perceptual experiences, which are automatically and consistently triggered by specific inducing stimuli. Synaesthesia therefore offers a unique window into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious perception. A long-standing question in synaesthesia research is whether it is possible to artificially induce non-synaesthetic individuals to have...

Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Lionel Naccache 138 citations

According to a popular distinction proposed by the philosopher Ned Block in 1995, our conscious experience would overflow the very limited set of what we can consciously report to ourselves and to others. He proposed to coin this limited consciousness 'Access Consciousness' (A-Cs) and to define 'Phenomenal Consciousness' as a much richer subjective experience that is not accessed but that would...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0357 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Access consciousness Global workspace Phenomenal consciousness

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Michael Pitts, Lydia A Lutsyshyna, Steven A. Hillyard 135 citations

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0348 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Access consciousness No-report paradigms Perceptual awareness Phenomenal consciousness +1

The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Ian Phillips 116 citations

Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by proposing a framework for eventual...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0347 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Cognitive access Methodological puzzle No-report paradigms Partial-report paradigms +2

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Morten Overgaard 62 citations

In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0353 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Access Phenomenal consciousness Subjective experience

Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Peter Fazekas, Morten Overgaard 30 citations

The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0340 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Access consciousness Cognitive access Phenomenal consciousness

Downgraded phenomenology: how conscious overflow lost its richness.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Emily J Ward 20 citations

Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures...

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0355 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Phenomenology Change blindness Inattentional blindness Visual awareness