Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction.
Peter Fazekas, Morten Overgaard
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0340 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Access consciousness Cognitive access Phenomenal consciousness |
| Citations | 30 |
| Key findings | The neural basis of perceptual consciousness may be independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms, but this remains an open question requiring further empirical and methodological work. |
Abstract
The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems and proposing novel approaches.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.