Downgraded phenomenology: how conscious overflow lost its richness.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0355 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Change blindness Inattentional blindness Visual awareness |
| Citations | 20 |
| Key points | Argues that failures of visual awareness, once memory and comparison failures are excluded, provide strong evidence against rich visual awareness and require theories to downgrade phenomenology. |
Abstract
Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as explanations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against rich awareness. To accommodate and explain these massive failures of awareness, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not reflect what we experience.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.