Philosophical Psychology
March 29, 2022
Nin Kirkham, Chris Letheby
15 citations
The urgent need for solutions to critical environmental challenges is well attested, but often environmental problems are understood as fundamentally collective action problems. However, to solve these problems, there is also a need to change individual behavior. Hence, there is a pressing need to inculcate in individuals the environmental virtues – virtues of character that relate to our...
Philosophical Psychology
February 27, 2022
Manuela Kirberg
ABSTRACT Although we are beginning to understand the neurocognitive processes that underlie the emergence of dreaming, what accounts for the bizarre phenomenology of dreams remains debated. I address this question by comparing dreaming with waking mind wandering and challenging previous accounts that utilize bizarreness to mark a sharp divide between conscious experiences in waking and...
Philosophical Psychology
October 11, 2021
Jae Ryeong Sul
3 citations
Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state, often present in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. Various phenomenological psychopathologists have proposed that delusional mood may not only precede but also contribute to the later formation of schizophrenic delusion. Hence, understanding experiential abnormalities involved with the delusional mood have been considered central for...
Philosophical Psychology
April 27, 2021
David B. Yaden, Derek Anderson
31 citations
ABSTRACT Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a...
Philosophical Psychology
December 5, 2020
Y. Ataria, O. Horovitz
13 citations
ABSTRACT This paper argues that severe and ongoing trauma (SOT) can lead to impairment at the level of the minimal self (MS), which is the core element in the structure of subjectivity. In the long-term, such impairments can result in complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) and schizophrenia. The paper tackles this issue while trying to create meaningful bridges between phenomenology and...
Philosophical Psychology
November 2, 2020
J. Aagaard
68 citations
ABSTRACT In recent years, we have witnessed the rise of a contemporary approach to cognitive psychology known as 4E cognition. According to this ‘extracranial’ view of cognition, the mind is not ensconced in the head, but dynamically intertwined with a host of different entities, social as well as technological. The purpose of the present article is to raise a concern about 4E cognition. The...
Philosophical Psychology
January 31, 2020
Adrian Downey
In Experienced Wholeness, Wanja Wiese tackles philosophical and empirical issues surrounding the “unified” nature of consciousness. He first provides an exhaustive summary of the positions which on...
Philosophical Psychology
March 20, 2019
M. Mascolo, Eeva K. Kallio
ABSTRACT Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied...
Philosophical Psychology
2019
Wayne Martin, Tania Gergel, Gareth S Owen
Time-consciousness has long been a focus of research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. We advance and extend this tradition of research by focusing on the character of temporal experience under conditions of mania. Symptom scales and diagnostic criteria for mania are peppered with temporally inflected language: increased rate of speech, racing thoughts, flight-of-ideas,...
Philosophical Psychology
September 19, 2018
Guido Löhr
36 citations
According to the embodied cognition hypothesis, the mental symbols used for higher cognitive reasoning, such as the making of deductive and inductive inferences, both originate and reside in our sensory-motor-introspective and emotional systems. The main objection to this view is that it cannot explain concepts that are, by definition, detached from perception and action, i.e., abstract...
Philosophical Psychology
September 18, 2018
Candace L. Upton, Michael Richard Brent
12 citations
While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, the most well developed extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of...
Philosophical Psychology
July 9, 2018
Martin Weichold
158 citations
It seems obvious that human adults sometimes entertain thoughts with propositional contents such as “Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content is a book worth reading,” and that those thoughts ...
Philosophical Psychology
October 25, 2017
François Kammerer
80 citations
Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the...
Philosophical Psychology
April 3, 2017
Mattia Gallotti, Bryce Huebner
23 citations
There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature...
Philosophical Psychology
October 3, 2014
Joshua Shepherd
33 citations
In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much...
Philosophical Psychology
September 27, 2011
Greg Janzen
201 citations
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory Uriah KriegelOxford: Oxford University Press, 2009333 pages, ISBN: 9780199570355 (hbk); $48.00For almost a decade, Uriah Kriegel has been on...
Philosophical Psychology
August 1, 2011
Michael Silberstein
15 citations
Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reduction Philosophy of Science Steven Horst New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 223 pages, ISBN: 0195317114 (hbk); $60.00 It seems to me that ther...
Philosophical Psychology
June 18, 2011
Michele Merritt
3 citations
The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), or the claim that cognitive processes are not entirely organism-bound and can extend into the world, has received a barrage of criticism. Likewise, defenders of HEC have responded and even retreated into more moderate positions. In this paper, I trace the debate, rehearsing what I take to be the three strongest cases against HEC: nonderived content,...
Philosophical Psychology
June 17, 2011
Josh Weisberg
6 citations
Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a “type-A” or “type-B” approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a “type-Q” materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual...
Philosophical Psychology
April 1, 2011
Miriam Kyselo, Sven Walter
5 citations
Daniel Weiskopf has recently raised an apparently powerful objection against the so-called “extended mind thesis” with regard to beliefs. His argument is that since alleged cases of “extended beliefs” lack a characteristic feature of beliefs properly so called (newly acquired beliefs are usually integrated with already existing beliefs rapidly, automatically and unconsciously), they do not...
Philosophical Psychology
March 26, 2011
Jennifer Matey
3 citations
A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology. Although these accounts have been useful for explaining some psychological states, one feature—phenomenality...
Philosophical Psychology
October 1, 2010
Jonah Wilberg
21 citations
In this paper I aim to defend David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against a prominent objection. The central claim of HOT theory is that a mental state is conscious only if one has the HOT that one is in that state. In broad outline, the objection is that HOT theory is unable to account for cases where the relevant HOTs are false. I consider two variants of the...
Philosophical Psychology
April 1, 2010
Erik C. Banks
43 citations
Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion...
Philosophical Psychology
September 22, 2007
Colin Klein
8 citations
Kohler's experiments with inverting goggles are often thought to support enactivism by showing that visual re-inversion occurs simultaneous with the return of sensorimotor skill. Closer examination reveals that Kohler's work does not show this. Recent work by Linden et al. shows that re-inversion, if it occurs at all, does not occur when the enactivist predicts. As such, the empirical evidence...
Philosophical Psychology
April 1, 2007
Simon Wigley
13 citations
Cognitive scientists have long noted that automated behavior is the rule, while conscious acts of self-regulation are the exception to the rule. On the face of it, automated actions appear to be immune to moral appraisal because they are not subject to conscious control. Conventional wisdom suggests that sleepwalking exculpates, while the mere fact that a person is performing a well-versed task...