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Meditation and the scope of mental action

Candace L. Upton, Michael Richard Brent

Philosophical Psychology September 18, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2018.1514491 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Meditation
Citations 12
Key points Argues that Galen Strawson's account of mental action, which holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to consciousness, fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action. Proposes that meditation serves as a useful model for understanding a wider range of mental actions, supported by psychological research on meditation and cognition and on meditation and introspection.

Abstract

While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, the most well developed extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this article, we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role.

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