Neurocognitive dynamics of spontaneous offline simulations: Re-conceptualizing (dream)bizarreness
Philosophical Psychology February 27, 2022 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2042231 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractDream bizarreness is not a marker of a sharp divide between waking and sleeping consciousness but a common feature of spontaneous offline simulations across the sleep-wake cycle. The author proposes that bizarreness arises from the dynamic, unconstrained, (hyper)associative, and highly variable nature of spontaneous thought. Rather than misrepresenting waking reality, bizarreness can reveal the building blocks of spontaneous cognition. The absence of bizarreness in thought is imposed by automatic and deliberate cognitive constraints; without such constraints, thought and memory processes are inherently marked by different degrees and types of bizarreness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology |
| Key finding | Proposes that bizarreness is a common, non-deficient feature of spontaneous offline simulations across the sleep-wake cycle and can be tied to the specific characteristics of spontaneous thought as dynamic, unconstrained, (hyper)associative, and highly variable in content. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT Although we are beginning to understand the neurocognitive processes that underlie the emergence of dreaming, what accounts for the bizarre phenomenology of dreams remains debated. I address this question by comparing dreaming with waking mind wandering and challenging previous accounts that utilize bizarreness to mark a sharp divide between conscious experiences in waking and sleeping. Instead, I propose that bizarreness is a common, non-deficient feature of spontaneous offline simulations occurring across the sleep-wake cycle and can be tied to the specific characteristics of spontaneous thought as being dynamic, unconstrained, (hyper)associative, and highly variable in content. Rather than misrepresenting waking reality, bizarreness can be employed to investigate the very building blocks of spontaneous cognition. The absence of bizarreness in thought processes is imposed by automatic and deliberate cognitive constraints. By contrast, thought and memory processes operating on their own without such constraints are inherently marked by different degrees and types of bizarreness.