Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?
Philosophical Psychology September 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2018.1517207 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 36 |
| Key points | Argues that the standard objection to embodied cognition, that it cannot explain abstract concepts detached from perception and action, has been taken for granted rather than detailed. Distinguishing one semantic and two epistemic versions of the objection allows existing solutions in the literature to be viewed more positively. |
Abstract
According to the embodied cognition hypothesis, the mental symbols used for higher cognitive reasoning, such as the making of deductive and inductive inferences, both originate and reside in our sensory-motor-introspective and emotional systems. The main objection to this view is that it cannot explain concepts that are, by definition, detached from perception and action, i.e., abstract concepts such as TRUTH or DEMOCRACY. This objection is usually merely taken for granted and has yet to be spelled out in detail. In this paper, I distinguish three different versions of this objection (one semantic and two epistemic versions). Once these distinctions are in place, we can begin to see the solutions offered in the literature in a new, more positive, light.