Collective intentionality and socially extended minds
Mattia Gallotti, Bryce Huebner
Philosophical Psychology April 3, 2017 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295629 (opens in new tab)
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Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 23 |
| Key points | Argues that claims about extended cognition are best situated within a broader framework of research on human sociality, and proposes a framework, drawn from literature on the socially extended mind and collective intentionality, for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. |
Abstract
There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.