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How consciousness will change our view on neuroscience

Morten Storm Overgaard

Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2010.497585 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Citations 17
Key points Argues that Victor Lamme's proposal to study consciousness without introspection is difficult to sustain, because Lamme still treats consciousness as subjective and introspection as the route to knowledge about it. Contends that Lamme's "neural arguments" fail to show independence from introspection, and that understanding neural correlates is shaped by introspection.

Abstract

Abstract Victor Lamme proposed that the study of consciousness should not be based on introspection. Nevertheless, Lamme understands consciousness as a subjective phenomenon, and introspection as the way in which we acquire knowledge about consciousness. This makes the task to find introspective-free methods to study consciousness difficult. Lamme attempts to make progress by introducing "neural arguments," but fails to show how such arguments are independent of introspective methods which seem necessary in order to decide how any neural process relates to mental phenomena. This commentary paper thus aims to show that our understanding of neural correlates is shaped by introspection.

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