What introspection has to offer, and where its limits lie
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2010.502224 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Argues that a science of consciousness should combine introspection, behavior, neuroscience, and theory, and that introspection shows qualia are about perceptual organization while neuroscience can locate when and where this occurs. Contends that access, in any guise, cannot explain where, when, and how qualia emerge. |
Abstract
A proper science of consciousness combines all the available evidence - either coming from introspection, behavior, neuroscience or theory - in such a way that a 'best of all worlds' perspective is attained. Introspection shows us that qualia are all about perceptual organization. Neuroscience can then tell us where and when perceptual organization occurs, and whether this is independent of attention, access or report. Access, no matter in what guise it comes, remains ill-suited to explain where, when and how qualia emerge.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade. Consciousness and Cognition April 1, 2020
- Challenges for theories of consciousness: seeing or knowing, the missing ingredient and how to deal with panpsychism. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
- Conscious access in the near absence of attention: critical extensions on the dual-task paradigm. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 1, 2018
- Six Theories Quietly Agree That Consciousness Is Experience