Explaining seeing? Disentangling qualia from perceptual organization
Agustin Ibanez, Tristan A Bekinschtein
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2010.497581 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that qualia are not required to explain visual integration processes, which can be accounted for by reentrant neural processing without attention or cognitive control. |
Abstract
Abstract Visual perception and integration seem to play an essential role in our conscious phenomenology. Relatively local neural processing of reentrant nature may explain several visual integration processes (feature binding or figure-ground segregation, object recognition, inference, competition), even without attention or cognitive control. Based on the above statements, should the neural signatures of visual integration (via reentrant process) be non-reportable phenomenological qualia? We argue that qualia are not required to understand this perceptual organization.