Consciousness and Cognition - The Consciousness Library

The functional contributions of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition August 10, 2022 Dylan Ludwig

The most widely endorsed philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness assume that it contributes a single functional capacity to an organism's information processing toolkit. However, conscious processes are a heterogeneous class of psychological phenomena supported by a variety of neurobiological mechanisms. This suggests a plurality of functional contributions of consciousness...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103383 Full text

Open monitoring meditation alters the EEG gamma coherence in experts meditators: The expert practice exhibit greater right intra-hemispheric functional coupling.

Consciousness and Cognition May 27, 2022 Guaraci Ken Tanaka, T. Russell, J. Bittencourt et al.

AIM This study investigated the differences in frontoparietal EEG gamma coherence between expert meditators (EM) and naïve meditators (NM). MATERIAL AND METHODS This is a cross-sectional study with a sample of twenty-one healthy adults divided under two groups (experts meditators vs. naive-meditators), with analyzing the intra-hemispheric coherence of frontoparietal gamma oscillations by...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103354

Continuity or compensation? - A hypothesis testing study concerning two types of dreamers' Aggressive Behaviors in Nightmares.

Consciousness and Cognition May 1, 2022 Jonas Mathes, Reinhard Pietrowsky

Being the aggressor in dreams has been investigated relatively sparsely. On the one hand, these kinds of nightmares may represent continuity of aggression in waking-life, but on the other hand, being the aggressor in dreams may compensate failing (suppressed) aggression from waking-life. Two subtypes of aggressor nightmares should thus be distinguished: Those in which the dreamer is the primary...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103321 Full text Nightmare Aggressive behavior Compensatory hypothesis Continuity hypothesis +1

Enriched category as a model of qualia structure based on similarity judgements.

Consciousness and Cognition May 1, 2022 Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Steven Phillips, Hayato Saigo

Qualitative relationships between two instances of conscious experiences can be quantified through the perceived similarity. Previously, we proposed that by defining similarity relationships as arrows and conscious experiences as objects, we can define a category of qualia in the context of category theory. However, the example qualia categories we proposed were highly idealized and limited to...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103319 Full text Consciousness Enriched category Qualia Similarity

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

Consciousness and Cognition April 28, 2022 Anna Ciaunica, Anil K. Seth, Jakub Limanowski et al. 76 citations

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of 'predicting precision' and how this...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103320 Sense of agency Inference Agency philosophy Psychology of self +3

Revisiting consciousness: Distinguishing between states of conscious focused attention and mind wandering with EEG.

Consciousness and Cognition April 19, 2022 M. R. Dias da Silva, Ó. Gonçalves, D. Branco et al.

Fluctuating between external conscious processing and mind wandering is inherent to the human condition. Past research showed that in tasks requiring sustained attention, mind wandering episodes in which attention is directed internally constrain conscious processing of external stimuli. Conversely, conscious processing of internal stimuli is enhanced during mind wandering. To investigate this,...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103332 Full text

Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory.

Consciousness and Cognition April 1, 2022 Francesco Ellia, Robert Chis-Ciure

In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt's Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi's and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d)....

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281 Full text Artificial consciousness Integrated information theory Neurobiological naturalism

First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument.

Consciousness and Cognition February 1, 2022 Michael H Herzog, Aaron Schurger, Adrien Doerig

We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, is a sufficient...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 Full text

Episodic thought distinguishes spontaneous cognition in waking from REM and NREM sleep.

Consciousness and Cognition 2022 Benjamin Baird, Mariel Kalkach Aparicio, Tariq Alauddin et al. 17 citations

Evidence suggests continuity between cognition in waking and sleeping states. However, one type of cognition that may differ is episodic thoughts of the past and future. The current study investigated this across waking, NREM sleep and REM sleep. We analyzed thought reports obtained from a large sample of individuals (N = 138) who underwent experience-sampling during wakefulness as well as...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103247 Full text Dreaming Autonoetic consciousness Episodic future thought Episodic memory +3

The myth of when and where: How false assumptions still haunt theories of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition 2022 Sepehrdad Rahimian 5 citations

Recent advances in neural sciences have uncovered countless facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103246 Full text Cartesian materialism Folk psychology Illusionism Phenomenal consciousness +1

Filled/non-filled pairs: An empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition 2022 Amber R Hopkins, Kelvin J. McQueen

Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one's visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103245 Full text Consciousness Feedback connectivity Filled/non-filled pairs Filling-in +2

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition November 1, 2021 Daniel Revach, Moti Salti

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103229 Full text Phenomenology Assumptions Awareness Cognition +5

On no man's land: Subjective experiences during unresponsive and responsive sedative states induced by four different anesthetic agents.

Consciousness and Cognition November 1, 2021 Linda Radek, Lauri Koskinen, Nils Sandman et al.

To understand how anesthetics with different molecular mechanisms affect consciousness, we explored subjective experiences recalled after responsive and unresponsive sedation induced with equisedative doses of dexmedetomidine, propofol, sevoflurane, and S-ketamine in healthy male participants (N = 140). The anesthetics were administered in experimental setting using target-controlled infusion...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103239 Full text Dreaming Ketamine Anesthesia Awareness +6

Do animals dream?

Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2021 Josie E Malinowski, D Scheel, M Mccloskey 25 citations

The understanding of biological functions of sleep has improved recently, including an understanding of the deep evolutionary roots of sleep among animals. However, dreaming as an element of sleep may be particularly difficult to address in non-human animals because in humans dreaming involves a non-wakeful form of awareness typically identified through verbal report. Here, we argue that...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103214 Full text Dreaming Animal consciousness Cephalopods Dream-enacting behaviours

The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states' constraints.

Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2021 Shaghayegh Konjedi, Reza Maleeh 8 citations

The dynamic framework of mind wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) is reviewed and modified through integrating the construct of mindful meta-awareness. The dynamic framework maintains that mind wandering belongs to a family of spontaneous thought phenomena. The key defining feature of mind wandering is 'spontaneity' which characterizes the dynamic nature of...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103194 Full text Cognitive control Dynamic framework Mental flexibility Mindful meta-awareness +1

Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics.

Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2021 Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Bob Coecke 4 citations

We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103168 Full text Phenomenology Compositionality Conscious agents Conscious experience +4

Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2021 M. Usher

The unfolding argument (UA) was advanced as a refutation of prominent theories, which posit that phenomenal experience is determined by patterns of neural activation in a recurrent (neural) network (RN) structure. The argument is based on the statement that any input-output function of an RN can be approximated by an "equivalent" feedforward-network (FFN). According to UA, if consciousness...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103212

Inter-brain co-activations during mindfulness meditation. Implications for devotional and clinical settings.

Consciousness and Cognition September 22, 2021 Alessio Matiz, Cristiano Crescentini, M. Bergamasco et al.

Mindfulness meditation usually takes place as personal, introspective activity. It is not known if this practice activates the brain differently when done alone or with someone else. Sixteen couples of expert meditators performed mindfulness-oriented meditation (MOM) and instructed mind-wandering (IMW) tasks in two conditions: once sitting in the same room (SR) and once in two different rooms...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103210

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis.

Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2021 Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Peter Fazekas 5 citations

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103173 Full text Access consciousness Empirical evidence Ibe Overflow +2

Computational models of the "active self" and its disturbances in schizophrenia.

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2021 Tim Julian Möller, Yasmin Kim Georgie, Guido Schillaci et al. 16 citations

The notion that self-disorders are at the root of the emergence of schizophrenia rather than a symptom of the disease, is getting more traction in the cognitive sciences. This is in line with philosophical approaches that consider an enactive self, constituted through action and interaction with the environment. We thereby analyze different definitions of the self and evaluate various...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103155 Full text Active self Cognitive robotics Computational psychiatry Developmental robotics +6

I did not expect to be dreaming: Explaining realization in lucid dreams with a Bayesian framework.

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2021 Piotr Szymanek 4 citations

The commonsense view is that a lucid dream starts when the dreamer realizes that they are currently dreaming. The notion of realization, however, has been accepted at face value, with little consideration of whether the dreamer realizes that they are dreaming in the sense of actual reasoning, or if it is a mere epiphenomenon of lucid dream initiation. This article offers a solution to this...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103163 Full text Lucid dream Bayes Dream cognition Probability +1

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life.

Consciousness and Cognition May 1, 2021 Anna Ciaunica, Axel Constant, Hubert Preissl et al. 99 citations

The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103117 Full text Active inference Allostasis Embodiment Homeostasis +3

Measuring the mental.

Consciousness and Cognition April 1, 2021 Michael Pauen, John-Dylan Haynes

Many philosophers have argued that the subjective character of conscious experience results in a fundamental deficit of third-person (henceforth: extrospective) access to first-person experience. By comparing extrospective measurement techniques with measurement techniques in the natural sciences, we will argue that extrospective methods suffer from no such deficit. After a rejection of some...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103106 Full text Consciousness Explanatory gap History of science Introspection +4

Dreams reflect nocturnal cognitive processes: Early-night dreams are more continuous with waking life, and late-night dreams are more emotional and hyperassociative.

Consciousness and Cognition February 1, 2021 Josie E Malinowski, Caroline L. Horton

Contributions of specific sleep stages to cognitive processes are increasingly understood. Non-REM sleep is particularly implicated in episodic memory consolidation, whilst REM sleep preferentially consolidates and regulates emotional information, and gives rise to creativity and insight. Dream content reflects these processes: non-REM dreams are more likely to picture episodic memories,...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.103071 Full text Dreaming Hyperassociativity Metaphor The continuity hypothesis

Embodied cognition: So flexible as to be "disembodied"?

Consciousness and Cognition January 22, 2021 Francesco Ianì

This review aims to explore what I call the "Embodiment Cost Hypothesis" (ECH), according to which, when humans "embody" a part of the world other than their bodies, a measurable cost is detectable on their real bodies. The review analyzes experimental evidence in favor of the ECH by examining studies from different research fields, including studies of action observation (2), tool-use (3),...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103075

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