Filled/non-filled pairs: An empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness.
Amber R Hopkins, Kelvin J. McQueen
Consciousness and Cognition 2022 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103245 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Feedback connectivity Filled/non-filled pairs Filling-in Integrated information theory Visual perception |
| Key findings | Filled/non-filled pairs challenge integrated information theory because they are phenomenologically identical yet involve different levels of integrated information (Φ). |
Abstract
Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one's visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with relatively high integrated information (Φ) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Φ.