Despite notable empirical advances, the science of consciousness lacks firm conceptual footing. Competing theories not only disagree on mechanisms but also define consciousness in mutually incompatible ways, and criteria for evaluating theoretical success remain vague. I argue that this situation arises from a lack of pragmatic pressure within the field. Theories are rewarded for offering ever...
Recent advances in neural sciences have uncovered countless facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of...
Recent advances in Neural sciences have uncovered countless new facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I will argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an...
The search for minimal neuronal requirements for consciousness rests on the premise that there exists a unique state of the human brain, the conscious state, that if one carefully excludes all the confounding cognitive functions, one will be able to isolate those regions that are involved in generating consciousness itself; nothing more, nothing less. I have argued elsewhere (Rahimian, 2021)...