The functional contributions of consciousness.
Consciousness and Cognition August 10, 2022 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103383 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that leading theories of consciousness fail to acknowledge the pluralism of functional contributions of consciousness across different psychological domains. |
Abstract
The most widely endorsed philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness assume that it contributes a single functional capacity to an organism's information processing toolkit. However, conscious processes are a heterogeneous class of psychological phenomena supported by a variety of neurobiological mechanisms. This suggests a plurality of functional contributions of consciousness (FCCs), in the sense that conscious experience facilitates different functional capacities in different psychological domains. In this paper, I first develop a general methodological framework for isolating the psychological functions that are associated with conscious experience. I then use this to show that the leading accounts-Global Workspace Theories, Higher Order Thought Theory and Information Integration Theory-all fail to acknowledge this functional pluralism, which limits their applicability as theories of consciousness.