Panpsychism—the view that consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality—is more likely to succeed as a theory of consciousness if it meets two conditions: compatibility with Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and a preliminary solution to the combination problem (how micro-level conscious experiences combine into macro-level ones). Evaluating constitutive, emergent, and panprotopsychist versions, the article concludes that weak emergent panpsychism, along with panqualitivist and panexperientialist panprotopsychism (or a combination), shows genuine potential for panpsychism to remain a coherent and viable position.
The idea that perception can occur entirely free from cognitive influence—pure perception—is examined and found unsupportable. Pure perception is often characterized as having nonconceptual content, an iconic format, and a unique phenomenology. The paper argues that this concept is untenable: introspection, psychological observation, and neuroanatomy all fail to provide empirical evidence for the existence of such pure perceptual states. No grounds were found to individuate these states, and specific theoretical worries further undermine the notion.