Bridging predictive processing and illusionism

Abstract

Theories of consciousness are commonly divided into two broad categories: functional and metaphysical. Functional theories seek to explain how cognitive processes generate conscious experience, whereas metaphysical theories attempt to explain why there is something it is like to be a conscious system. These two traditions have largely developed in parallel, rarely intersecting. In this paper, I argue that they can be systematically connected. Specifically, I argue that if Predictive Processing (PP) provides the correct computational architecture of cognition, then it supports an illusionist interpretation of phenomenal consciousness. The argument proceeds through a series of conditionals linking predictive perception, predictive introspection, and phenomenal consciousness. I first argue that perceptual experience is necessarily mediated by inferential, model-dependent representations and therefore involves structural misrepresentation. I then argue that the predictive architecture extends recursively to introspective awareness. Finally, I argue that phenomenal consciousness is generated by introspective awareness and therefore inherits its inferential and model-dependent character, thereby providing a systematic argument that Predictive Processing is most coherently interpreted within an illusionist framework. The paper thus illustrates how a functional theory of cognition can entail substantive metaphysical consequences for our understanding of consciousness.